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ABSTRACT 
We are concerned with providing more empirical evidence on forecast failure, 
developing forecast models, and examining the impact of events such as audit reports. A 
joint consideration of classic financial ratios and relevant external indicators leads us to 
build a basic prediction model focused in non-financial Galician SMEs. Explanatory 
variables are relevant financial indicators from the viewpoint of the financial logic and 
financial failure theory. The paper explores three mathematical models: discriminant 
analysis, Logit, and linear multivariate regression. We conclude that, even though they 
both offer high explanatory and predictive abilities, Logit and MDA models should be 
used and interpreted jointly. 
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A MODEL TO FORECAST FINANCIAL FAILURE, IN NON FINANCIAL 
GALICIAN SMES. 
1 INTRODUCTION1 
Financial failure - bankruptcy, temporary insolvencies, creditor’s meeting, coalitions 
and divisions - is a recurrent question in financial literature, because of its theoretical 
relevance, and also because of its serious consequences for economic activity. The first 
contributions by Beaver (1966), Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980) examined different 
methodological options to develop explanatory and forecast models. The most classic 
approach (Altman, 1968; Altman et al., 1977; Altman, 2000; Altman et al., 2010) 
enriched with the development of alternative methods, more reliable, and less dependent 
of methodological hypothetical conditions, namely Logit and probit analysis (Martin, 
1977; Ohlson, 1980; Zmijewski, 1984). Recursive partitioning techniques (Frydman et 
al., 1985) and different artificial intelligence-based techniques, such as expert systems, 
neural networks (Messier and Hansen, 1988; Bell et al., 1990; Hansen and Messier, 
1991; Mountain and Martin of the Mettle, 1993; Koh and So, 1999; Brockett et al., 
2006), and support vector machines (SVM) (Shin et al., 2005; Härdle et al., 2005). The 
complex and unstructured nature of the analysis has also led to the the application of 
heuristic methods such as computer-supported social decision techniques (level 3 
GDSS, e.g. Sun and Li, 2009) and fuzzy logic – based models (Dubois and Prade, 1992; 
Slowinski and Zopounidis, 1995; McKee and Lensberg, 2002). 
Financial failure was first studied from a formalized perspective by Beaver (1966); his 
works examines whether financial ratios supply relevant information to evaluate and 
forecast crash scenarios, temporary insolvencies, dividends unpaid, and overdrafts. 
Beaver verified the predictive ability of cash flow to total debt, net income to total 
assets and several other capital and/or assets - based ratios. 
                                                             1 This work has been elaborated with the financial support of Xunta de Galicia (programa sectorial de investigación aplicada de I+D suma, programa incite), Project 10SEC100012PR: Determinación 
de un Modelo de Previsión del Fracaso e Insolvencia Empresarial de las Pymes Gallegas. 
Beaver’s formulation (1966) contributes an enlarged vision of coherent financial failure 
which is also coherent with modern Finance; nevertheless it suffers some 
methodological limitations. The view of financial failure forecast as a multivariate 
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problem is due to Altman (1968). He suggests the development of discriminant analysis 
models that, regardless their fitness, could be used as standard rules and therefore 
contribute to reinforce the objectivity of solvency analysis. Nevertheless MDA 
application is conditioned by its theoretical requirements, namely homoscedasticity and 
the normal conjoint distribution of factors; moreover, given its mathematical 
configuration, MDA models do not provide detailed information to specify the causes 
and the internal structure of the event failure, even when different time frames are taken 
into consideration (de Llano et al., 2010).   
Ohlson (1980) suggests the use of logistic regression to evaluate the likelihood of 
failure, following Martin (1977) seminal work on financial companies. Ohlson (1980) 
improves Martin's original position contributing a theoretical basis that allows for 
estimations of the probability of failure of non-financial companies, according to four 
basic attributes: dimension, financial structure, financial yield, and liquidity. Besides 
methodological improvements, logit approach is coherent with the view of bankruptcy 
as a complex process where “several greys” can be identified. In fact, managers may be 
interested not in an exhaustive, rigorous, classification but in a measure of the 
likelihood that the company goes bankruptcy or suffers financial distress within a given 
period of time. Ohlson (1980) also corroborates that the combination of financial 
information and market indicators substantially improves the ability to forecast financial 
distress. Several external data and signs can be used to increase model’s fit, e.g. market 
prices, volatility, minimized external information flows, delays in financial statements’ 
deposit, qualified audit opinions, and auditor’s changes (Piñeiro et al., 2011).   
The development and validation of these models has provided valuable information 
about the very nature of the financial and/or organizational processes leading to failure, 
and the key variables that managers should keep an eye on, in order to anticipate 
financial difficulties and evaluate borrowers’ credit risk: a few critical ratios (e.g. 
liquidity, profitability and working capital) (Rodríguez et al., 2010), macroeconomic 
and risk-related factors (Rose et al., 1982), proxies of the management quality (Peel et 
al., 1986; Keasey and Watson, 1987), and qualitative signs inferred from audits (Piñeiro 
et al., 2011).   
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Given the severity of financial failure, empirical work emphasized the ability of the 
models to identify firms under financial stress and forecast bankruptcy itself. Thus, 
validation is aimed, specifically, to avoid type II error (classify as healthy a financially 
distressed, high risk, company). But type I error is also clearly relevant because “false 
positives” can damage companies’ reputation and induce a self-fulfilling prophecy, thus 
leading healthy companies to severe financial difficulties. Ohlson (1980) emphasized 
that error rates reported by previous studies (namely in Altman’s MDA models) were 
remarkably low, and later works confirm the existence of biases in type I and type II 
errors (de Llano et al., 2010). Maybe because sampling and/or by mathematical reasons, 
models accomplishing remarkable results among bankrupted companies reach only 
moderate results when applied on solvents companies, and this suggest that models tend 
to overestimate failure probability: the proportion of healthy companies qualified as 
potentially bankrupt it is very high, remarkably higher than type I error. According to 
our experience, this bias is more likely in companies who develop characteristic 
activities, emerging business and/or show idiosyncratic financial properties, e.g. 
peculiar temporal patterns in cash flow generation. This is closely related with the need 
to recalibrate models (Moyer, 1977; Altman, 2000). Aside from its statistical relevance, 
type I errors may have severe consequences for companies: as they undermine the trust 
of lenders and markets, they can reduce companies’ financial resources and lead them to 
a self-fulfilled insolvency.   
This work offers evidence on the prediction of financial distress in non-financial 
Galician SMEs. These companies are uncommon by several reasons, e.g. a very small 
size, family-owned capital, relatively high leverage, and low management 
specialization, therefore generalized models (such as Altman’s Z-score and market-
based models) seem not applicable. We aim to develop a focused model to describe and 
support the forecasting of financial distress on the basis of financial data; a second 
objective is to provide empirical evidence to reduce the likelihood of type I errors. 
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2 
2.1 
METHOD 
SAMPLE 
2.1.1 
Our work is based on two random samples of SMEs Galician companies: the first one is 
made of healthy companies and the second one is made of financially distressed 
companies. Bankruptcy is defined in wide terms as a situation of financial instability 
that might lead the company to fill for bankruptcy in the short or medium term; 
companies are classified according to the information supplied by financial statements 
and public registers (RAI, BADEXCUG). Thus one company may be classified as 
financially distressed even though no fill for bankruptcy has been presented. This 
approach offers a more flexible and effective way to express situations that, even though 
do not imply an irreversible bankruptcy, are logically linked with financial instability – 
e.g. abnormal leverage, lack of liquidity or overdue credits -.  
Failed companies 
SABI2
2.1.2 
 database contains 75.640 Galician companies; three hundred and eighty four 
(384) of them have filed for bankruptcy within the last ten years. Sixty two of these 
companies (approximately, 16% of 384) received at least one qualified opinion from 
1999 to 2009. In the same period, thirty nine companies received an adverse opinion 
and in forty four companies auditors issued a disclaimer opinion. Auditors’ report is not 
available for the rest of the companies either because they are not required to audit their 
financial statements or because companies didn’t meet their obligation to publish those 
statements and auditor’s report. 
Healthy companies 
                                                             2 Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos. 
These second group is made of active, healthy SMEs. They have not filed for 
bankruptcy, nor are listed in insolvency public registers (they have not suffered any 
financial incident within the last ten years), therefore they are financially healthy 
companies, not affected by severe financial difficulties. These companies have also 
received, in all and each one of the exercises between 1999 and 2009, an unqualified 
audit report. The resulting sample is made of one hundred and seven (107) companies. 
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2.2 
Models are based in a subset of financial variables and ratios, selected by expert 
judgment according to the the frequency and level of significance showed in previous 
research works. In all cases, ratios were calculated from the magnitudes listed in the 
Annual Accounts, without any adjustment (e.g. alternative accounting methods or 
market-based valuation). Some of our models include external auditing-related 
indicators. 
VARIABLES    
Var. Content Var. Content 
ACT01 Interests/ value added LIQ10 Stock & inventories / short term loans 
ACT02 Salaries/ non current assets LIQ11 
(Stock & inventories + credits & fin. Investments) / short term 
loans 
ACT03 (Salaries + amortization) / value added LIQ12 Non-credit period 
ACT04 Income / costs LIQ13 Credits & fin. Investments / short term loans 
ACT05 Value added / sales REN01 Ebit / total assets 
APL01 Ebit / interests REN02 Ebit / sales 
APL02 Interests/ loans REN03 Net profit / sales 
APL03 Operating profit / interests REN04 
(Net profit - credits & fin. Investments – stock & inventories) / 
total assets 
APL04 Net profit / loans REN05 Net profit / total assets 
END01 Loans / equity capital REN06 Net profit / equity capital 
END02 
(Equity capital – net profit) / short term 
loans 
ROT01 Current assets – stock & inventories / sales 
END03 Equity capital / loans ROT02 Stock & inventories / sales 
END04 Long term loans / loans ROT03 Sales / credits & fin. Investments cierto 
EST01 Current assets / total assets ROT04 Sales / current assets 
EST02 Amortization / non current assets  ROT05 Sales / non current assets 
EST03 Working capital / total assets ROT06 Sales / total assets 
EST04 Working capital / loans ROT07 Sales / working capital  
EST05 Working capital / sales ROT08 Sales / cash 
EST06 Cash / total assets SOL01 (Current assets – stock & inventories) / short term loans 
EST07 Net profit / working capital SOL02 Current assets / loans 
EST08 Assets decomposition SOL03 Current assets / short term loans 
LIQ01 Operating cash flow / total assets SOL04 Non current assets / equity capital 
LIQ02 Operating cash flow / loans SOL05 Loans / total assets 
LIQ03 Operating cash flow / short term loans SOL06 Equity capital / total assets 
LIQ04 Operating cash flow / sales SOL07 Equity capital / non current assets 
LIQ05 Cash flow gen. Res. / total assets SOL08 Short term loans / total assets 
LIQ06 Cash flow gen. Res. / loans SOL09 (Net profit + taxes) / short term loans 
LIQ07 Cash flow gen. Res. / short term loans TES01 Cash / short term loans 
LIQ08 Cash flow gen. Res. / sales TES02 Cash / sales 
LIQ09 Cash / short term loans 
  
NUM Number of auditor changes RATMOD Rate of modified opinion reports 
AVDUR Average duration of auditors’ contract DISCLO The failure to comply with the obligation to file and disclose 
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Var. Content Var. Content 
its financial statements 
CONCU 
Concurrency of auditor changes and the 
revealing of uncertainties 
  
Figure 1. Independent variables 
2.3 MULTIVARIATE METHODS 
We have carried out several MDA, logit and LR estimations to test whether financial 
ratios and audit-related external signs can be used as predictors of financial distress in 
Galician SMEs. We then verify the predictive capacity of the models, applying them to 
the sample and estimating the corresponding prediction error-rate. In each case, a model 
has been estimated for each of the following time horizons: one year before failure, two 
years before failure, three years before failure, and four years before failure. This 
methodology has been applied to develop absorbent models for each of the four years 
of planning horizon – these are the "Omega Models"-. A fifth time-independent model 
has also been estimated, to support a sensitivity analysis and test the significance and 
stability of the estimates. Finally, we estimate a logit model in order to evaluate the 
informational content of auditor’ reports and several related indicators. 
All models were estimated applying 
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using step selection. This selection method does 
not guarantee an optimal final set of factors (because of conditional contrasts), but it is 
and efficient and logical strategy to find a good combination of variables; it is also 
consistent with the parsimony principle - making simple and understandable models -. 
3.1 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Final MDA models combine several measures of leverage, capital structure, 
profitability, activity and liquidity. Short term forecasts rely mostly in immediate 
liquidity and current loans, while financial stability in the long run seems to be more 
related with leverage and capital structure, profitability, and term structure of assets
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS (MDA) MODELS   
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• 
.  
060604 311'1201'0284'4339'01. SOLROTAPLMDA +++−=  
• 1204 61'0871'7127'02. LIQAPLMDA ++=                                                               3 See appendix. 
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• 050605 734'7108'2706'1398'03. LIQSOLRENMDA +++−=  
• 120506030304 1466'1891'3823'4913'2883'053'6312'04. LIQLIQSOLESTENDAPLMDA +−+−−+−=  
• 0506030304 975'1011'0159'1376'0399'0275'0. LIQROTESTENDAPLGlobalMDA +++++−=  
3.1.1 
When applied to failed companies, MDA models achieve a satisfactory hit rate (up to 
98% in some cases, and 85% in average, four years before the failure). Average hit rate 
increases as the company approaches bankruptcy, thus model’s reliability diminishes in 
the long run (
MDA in failed companies 
¡Error! No se encuentra el origen de la referencia.). 
Forecast Failure s/(H,F) 1yb 2yb 3yb 4yb 5yb 6yb 7yb 8yb 9yb 10yb 11yb 
MDA 1 Forecast 96,3% 94,6% 93,9% 92,3% 91,0% 91,7% 90,7% 89,4% 85,9% 82,0% 80,2% 
Healthy 6 9 16 20 23 20 20 21 26 29 18 
Failure 154 158 245 240 233 220 194 177 159 132 73 
MDA 2 Forecast 93,7% 94,0% 92,0% 90,4% 89,8% 91,3% 91,6% 89,7% 85,8% 87,0% 87,9% 
Healthy 10 10 21 25 26 21 18 20 26 21 11 
Failure 149 158 240 235 230 219 196 175 157 140 80 
MDA 3 Forecast 98,1% 98,8% 98,4% 98,1% 97,6% 100,0% 96,3% 98,0% 96,2% 97,5% 96,7% 
Healthy 3 2 4 5 6 0 8 4 7 4 3 
Failure 156 165 254 252 248 237 209 195 179 155 89 
MDA 4 Forecast 90,7% 90,6% 85,4% 85,8% 84,0% 83,3% 86,7% 84,7% 81,0% 85,4% 85,7% 
Healthy 15 16 38 37 41 40 28 30 35 23 12 
Failure 147 154 223 223 216 200 183 166 149 134 72 
MDA GLOBAL Forecast 90,3% 84,8% 84,0% 82,8% 82,4% 81,7% 77,2% 79,8% 77,6% 78,0% 82,4% 
Healthy 15 25 42 45 45 44 49 40 41 35 15 
Failure 139 139 220 216 210 196 166 158 142 124 70 
Figure 2. Hit rate (MDA, failed companies, full information available) 
Models’ reliability is also affected by information lags. It is remarkably that models’ 
performance seems to be correlated with the amount of information available, and this 
flow of information gets more and more scarce as financial distress deepens. We were 
able to obtain financial information for 155, 146, 262 and 261 companies (of a total of 
265) for one, two, three, and four years before the company failed. Companies cutting 
the external flow of financial information are more likely to fail in the short and 
medium term.  
In our sample, the number of more than eight years-old companies is modest because 
several corporate operations – e.g. mergers, absorptions and evolution to plc – may have 
happened; these situations are quite common, given the special nature of the business in 
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out our sample and also induce information lags. When models are applied to the 
unabridged sample, regardless information lags, hit rate diminishes but is still 
satisfactory. 
 
Forecast  Failure s/(H,F) 1yb 2yb 3yb 4yb 5yb 6yb 7yb 8yb 9yb 10yb 11yb 
MDA 1 Forecast 
No information  
39,6% 37,0% 1,5% 1,9% 3,4% 9,4% 19,2% 25,3% 30,2% 39,2% 65,7% 
Forecast Error  2,3% 3,4% 6,0% 7,5% 8,7% 7,5% 7,5% 7,9% 9,8% 10,9% 6,8% 
Hit rate 58,1% 59,6% 92,5% 90,6% 87,9% 83,0% 73,2% 66,8% 60,0% 49,8% 27,5% 
MDA 2 Forecast 
No information  
40,0% 36,6% 1,5% 1,9% 3,4% 9,4% 19,2% 26,4% 30,9% 39,2% 65,7% 
Forecast Error  3,8% 3,8% 7,9% 9,4% 9,8% 7,9% 6,8% 7,5% 9,8% 7,9% 4,2% 
Hit rate 56,2% 59,6% 90,6% 88,7% 86,8% 82,6% 74,0% 66,0% 59,2% 52,8% 30,2% 
MDA 3 Forecast 
No information 
40,0% 37,0% 2,6% 3,0% 4,2% 10,6% 18,1% 24,9% 29,8% 40,0% 65,3% 
Forecast Error  1,1% 0,8% 1,5% 1,9% 2,3% 0,0% 3,0% 1,5% 2,6% 1,5% 1,1% 
Hit rate 58,9% 62,3% 95,8% 95,1% 93,6% 89,4% 78,9% 73,6% 67,5% 58,5% 33,6% 
MDA 4 Forecast 
No information 
38,9% 35,8% 1,5% 1,9% 3,0% 9,4% 20,4% 26,0% 30,6% 40,8% 68,3% 
Forecast Error  5,7% 6,0% 14,3% 14,0% 15,5% 15,1% 10,6% 11,3% 13,2% 8,7% 4,5% 
Hit rate 55,5% 58,1% 84,2% 84,2% 81,5% 75,5% 69,1% 62,6% 56,2% 50,6% 27,2% 
MDA GLOBAL Forecast 
No information 
41,9% 38,1% 1,1% 1,5% 3,8% 9,4% 18,9% 25,3% 30,9% 40,0% 67,9% 
Forecast Error  5,7% 9,4% 15,8% 17,0% 17,0% 16,6% 18,5% 15,1% 15,5% 13,2% 5,7% 
Hit rate 52,5% 52,5% 83,0% 81,5% 79,2% 74,0% 62,6% 59,6% 53,6% 46,8% 26,4% 
Figure 3. Hit rate (MDA, failed companies, including those affected by information 
lags) 
3.1.2 MDA in healthy companies   
The application of MDA models to the sample of 107 healthy companies shows a 
comparatively poor performance (. Hit rate is lower than 40% in most of the scenarios, 
thus the model is absolutely not a relevant decision support, but it is noticeable that the 
same model fits extremely well the sample of failed companies. This is akin to similar 
biases reported by previous studies. One possible explanation is the fact that the sample 
of healthy companies is more complex and heterogeneous than the sample of failed 
companies – as we have seen, the latter can be defined by a few ratios –; this might lead 
to a higher rate of misclassifications in healthy companies. Anyway this bias should be 
taken into account by practitioners because empirical evidence suggest that MDA 
models might overstate bankruptcy risk. 
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Forecast Healthy s/(H,F) 1yb 2yb 3yb 4yb 5yb 6yb 7yb 8yb 9yb 10yb 11yb 
MDA 1 Forecast 39,3% 37,4% 43,9% 43,9% 44,9% 47,7% 45,8% 43,9% 46,7% 53,3% 48,1% 
Healthy 42 40 47 47 48 51 49 47 50 56 50 
Non healthy 65 67 60 60 59 56 58 60 57 49 54 
MDA 2 Forecast 43,9% 36,4% 40,2% 36,4% 41,1% 39,3% 42,1% 38,3% 38,3% 42,9% 43,3% 
Healthy 47 39 43 39 44 42 45 41 41 45 45 
Non healthy 60 68 64 68 63 65 62 66 66 60 59 
MDA 3 Forecast 9,3% 11,2% 8,4% 5,6% 8,4% 9,3% 8,4% 10,3% 7,5% 8,6% 10,6% 
Healthy 10 12 9 6 9 10 9 11 8 9 11 
Non healthy 97 95 98 101 98 97 98 96 99 96 93 
MDA 4 Forecast 42,1% 33,6% 35,5% 24,3% 29,9% 31,8% 35,5% 33,6% 33,6% 28,6% 34,6% 
Healthy 45 36 38 26 32 34 38 36 36 30 36 
Non healthy 62 71 69 81 75 73 69 71 71 75 68 
MDA GLOBAL Forecast 32,7% 26,2% 28,0% 23,4% 28,0% 27,1% 25,2% 24,3% 24,3% 21,9% 21,2% 
Healthy 35 28 30 25 30 29 27 26 26 23 22 
Non healthy 72 79 77 82 77 78 80 81 81 82 82 
Figure 4. Hit rate (MDA, healthy companies) 
It is remarkable that, the more advanced is the forecast, the lower is the company’s 
estimated creditworthiness, whatever it is really healthy or not. The forecast improves as 
the failure gets closer, but credit risk tends to be systematically overestimated in all 
business categories, both in long and short term. One interpretation is that MDA score 
offers early warnings about latent financial instabilities that may evolve to a real 
financial distress, or not, subject to management decisions and environmental 
conditions; companies should be analysed in more detail to clarify the real credit risk. 
3.2 LOGIT MODELS 
Several logit models have been estimated following Ohlson (1980) seminal work; in 
this case, the exhaustive 10K-based listing of failed companies has been replaced by a 
more fuzzy dependent variable expressing not only fillings for bankruptcy but also 
delays in payments (e.g. dishonoured bills and unpaid invoices) formally registered by 
public databases. Final models have been estimated by applying a step-by-step 
procedure to select relevant factors4
 
: 
                                                             4 See appendix. 
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• ( )1206060304 929'2815'30603'2584'5066'11444'81
11. LIQSOLROTENDAPLe
LOGIT
++−+−−+
=
 
• ( )0423'111974'01
12. APLe
LOGIT
−−+
=
 
• ( )0605 216'6765'33678'11
13. SOLRENe
LOGIT
−−−+
=
 
• ( )06050304 348'17773'34284'4448'49102'31
14. SOLRENENDAPLe
LOGIT
−++−−+
=
 
• ( )0503 254'11711'3673'01
1. LIQESTe
GlobalLOGIT
−−−+
=
 
3.2.1 Logit models in failed companies   
We have first simulated the application of logit models to the failed companies’ sample. 
Hit rate is high in most cases (up to 88%) but, also, unstable in different terms and 
different model structures; results are especially poor in logit.2 model, which is based in 
just one variable (APL04 – net profit over loans) but, overall, MDA models outperform 
logit models. Moreover, forecasting performance of logit models degrades rapidly in the 
long term, thus models reliability seems to be limited to a few years prior to the failure. 
 
Forecast Failure s/(H,F) 1yb 2yb 3yb 4yb 5yb 6yb 7yb 8yb 9yb 10yb 11yb 
LOGIT 1 Forecast 81,8% 87,3% 87,9% 87,5% 85,0% 82,4% 84,5% 86,6% 83,6% 78,1% 70,0% 
Healthy 29 21 31 32 38 42 33 26 30 35 27 
Failure 130 145 226 225 216 197 180 168 153 125 63 
LOGIT 2 Forecast 65,8% 58,2% 54,5% 54,3% 45,6% 48,3% 39,3% 42,1% 41,5% 30,2% 31,9% 
Healthy 54 69 117 117 137 122 128 113 107 111 62 
Failure 104 96 140 139 115 114 83 82 76 48 29 
LOGIT 3 Forecast 78,6% 70,8% 64,0% 62,3% 57,2% 59,6% 48,9% 52,0% 48,7% 44,7% 50,0% 
Healthy 34 49 94 98 110 97 112 96 96 89 46 
Failure 125 119 167 162 147 143 107 104 91 72 46 
MD 4 Forecast 76,8% 81,8% 77,1% 76,6% 75,3% 72,5% 69,8% 70,9% 68,9% 62,0% 65,9% 
Healthy 36 30 60 61 63 66 64 57 56 60 29 
Failure 119 135 202 200 192 174 148 139 124 98 56 
MDGLOBAL Forecast 73,6% 70,6% 66,7% 66,3% 64,3% 66,5% 66,1% 62,6% 62,6% 59,9% 60,4% 
Healthy 43 50 87 88 92 81 75 76 71 67 38 
Failure 120 120 174 173 166 161 146 127 119 100 58 
Figure 5. Logit hit rate (failed companies, full information) 
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Forecast Failure s/(H,F) 1yb 2yb 3yb 4yb 5yb 6yb 7yb 8yb 9yb 10yb 11yb 
LOGIT 1 Forecast 
No information 
40,0% 37,4% 3,0% 3,0% 4,2% 9,8% 19,6% 26,8% 30,9% 39,6% 66,0% 
Forecast Error  10,9% 7,9% 11,7% 12,1% 14,3% 15,8% 12,5% 9,8% 11,3% 13,2% 10,2% 
Hit rate 49,1% 54,7% 85,3% 84,9% 81,5% 74,3% 67,9% 63,4% 57,7% 47,2% 23,8% 
LOGIT 2 Forecast 
No information 
40,4% 37,7% 3,0% 3,4% 4,9% 10,9% 20,4% 26,4% 30,9% 40,0% 65,7% 
Forecast Error  20,4% 26,0% 44,2% 44,2% 51,7% 46,0% 48,3% 42,6% 40,4% 41,9% 23,4% 
Hit rate 39,2% 36,2% 52,8% 52,5% 43,4% 43,0% 31,3% 30,9% 28,7% 18,1% 10,9% 
LOGIT 3 Forecast 
No information 
40,0% 36,6% 1,5% 1,9% 3,0% 9,4% 17,4% 24,5% 29,4% 39,2% 65,3% 
Forecast Error  12,8% 18,5% 35,5% 37,0% 41,5% 36,6% 42,3% 36,2% 36,2% 33,6% 17,4% 
Hit rate 47,2% 44,9% 63,0% 61,1% 55,5% 54,0% 40,4% 39,2% 34,3% 27,2% 17,4% 
LOGIT 4 Forecast 
No information 
41,5% 37,7% 1,1% 1,5% 3,8% 9,4% 20,0% 26,0% 32,1% 40,4% 67,9% 
Forecast Error  13,6% 11,3% 22,6% 23,0% 23,8% 24,9% 24,2% 21,5% 21,1% 22,6% 10,9% 
Hit rate 44,9% 50,9% 76,2% 75,5% 72,5% 65,7% 55,8% 52,5% 46,8% 37,0% 21,1% 
LOGIT GLOBAL Forecast 
No information 
38,5% 35,8% 1,5% 1,5% 2,6% 8,7% 16,6% 23,4% 28,3% 37,0% 63,8% 
Forecast Error  16,2% 18,9% 32,8% 33,2% 34,7% 30,6% 28,3% 28,7% 26,8% 25,3% 14,3% 
Hit rate 45,3% 45,3% 65,7% 65,3% 62,6% 60,8% 55,1% 47,9% 44,9% 37,7% 21,9% 
Figure 6. Logit hit rate (all failed companies) 
 
3.2.2 Logit models in healthy companies 
Again, forecasting ability of logit models show a remarkable instability. Unexpectedly, 
error rate is higher in the short term (one and two years before failure) and in the very 
long term (ten and eleven years before failure), while hit rate tends to increase in the 
medium term (four to six years before failure). We believe this must be read in 
conjunction with economic recession: solvency, profitability and financial stability 
might be deteriorating progressively due to the adverse external conditions; models 
might be unable to cope with this changes because, even though several specific 
attributes (e.g. leverage and management quality) can modulate bankruptcy likelihood, 
financial crisis is driven by systemic factors that are not addressed by company-level 
models. 
Despite these anomalies, logit models clearly outperform MDA models in classifying 
healthy companies. As some previous works have stated (de Llano et al., 2010 & 2011), 
MDA and logit models performance differs depending on whether company under 
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analysis is (really) failed or healthy: MDA tends to overstate the likelihood of a 
bankruptcy, while logit regression tends to overestimate the probability of failure. This 
highlights the need to jointly interpret MDA and logit analysis results
 
. 
Healthy Forecast s/(HS,F) 1yb 2yb 3yb 4yb 5yb 6yb 7yb 8yb 9yb 10yb 11yb 
LOGIT 1 Forecast 16,8% 20,6% 18,7% 18,7% 21,5% 27,1% 22,4% 23,4% 27,1% 28,6% 28,8% 
Healthy 18 22 20 20 23 29 24 25 29 30 30 
Failure 89 85 87 87 84 78 83 82 78 75 74 
LOGIT 2 Forecast 73,8% 81,3% 87,9% 91,6% 92,5% 88,8% 89,7% 90,7% 89,7% 90,5% 91,3% 
Healthy 79 87 94 98 99 95 96 97 96 95 95 
Failure 28 20 13 9 8 12 11 10 11 10 9 
LOGIT 3 Forecast 83,2% 81,3% 83,2% 86,9% 89,7% 89,7% 86,0% 86,0% 82,2% 85,7% 86,5% 
Healthy 89 87 89 93 96 96 92 92 88 90 90 
Failure 18 20 18 14 11 11 15 15 19 15 14 
LOGIT 4 Forecast 68,2% 71,0% 80,4% 80,4% 82,2% 83,2% 79,4% 76,6% 72,9% 77,1% 82,7% 
Healthy 73 76 86 86 88 89 85 82 78 81 86 
Failure 34 31 21 21 19 18 22 25 29 24 18 
LOGIT GLOBAL Forecast 75,7% 77,6% 77,6% 77,6% 82,2% 81,3% 77,6% 80,4% 76,6% 74,3% 76,9% 
Healthy 81 83 83 83 88 87 83 86 82 78 80 
Failure 26 24 24 24 19 20 24 21 25 27 24 
Figure 7. Logit hit rate (healthy companies) 
 
3.3 LINEAL REGRESSION MODELS   
Linear regression (LR) performance is in a clear abandonment stage in the literature 
because of its shortcomings, namely a very poor forecasting performance and the 
previously stated difficulty to verify the requirement of normally distributed predictors. 
Anyway we have estimated a set of LR models for 1 – 4 years before the bankruptcy, 
and then conducted a simulation to establish models reliability. 
• 060604 327'0005'0068'1584'01. SOLROTAPLMRL −−−=  
• 1204 153'0979'1468'02. LIQAPLMRL −−=  
• 050605 867'1509'0308'3524'03. LIQSOLRENMRL +−−=  
• 120506030304 356'0945'0171'1727'0215'0586'1576'04. LIQLIQSOLESTENDAPLMRL −−−−+−=  
• 0506030304 431'0002'0253'0082'0087'056'0. SLIQROTESTENDAPLGlobalMRL −−−−−=  
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Forecasting reliability is extremely high in failed companies (up to 99% four years 
before failure), nevertheless LR models fall flat in healthy companies: almost all 
companies are classified as failed, whatever their financial situation and credit risk are, 
and average hit rate is lower than 5% in healthy companies. This is because LR 
underlying estimation method does not effectively meet the rationale of financial 
healthiness, that is, the several equilibrium relations the company must address in order 
to assure survival; the discrete, dichotomous, nature of dependent variable (failed vs. 
non failed) is also a relevant question, given that standard LR is intended for continuous 
variables. 
 
Forecast Failure s/(H,F) 1yb 2yb 3yb 4yb 5yb 6yb 7yb 8yb 9yb 10yb 11yb 
MRL 1 Forecast 85,0% 95,8% 96,6% 98,8% 98,4% 96,7% 99,5% 99,5% 100,0% 98,8% 98,9% 
MRL 2 Forecast 75,5% 89,3% 93,5% 93,5% 94,1% 91,3% 94,4% 94,4% 95,6% 94,4% 96,7% 
MRL 3 Forecast 81,8% 93,4% 96,5% 97,7% 97,2% 97,0% 98,6% 98,5% 97,8% 97,5% 98,9% 
MRL 4 Forecast 71,8% 86,4% 88,0% 88,0% 87,9% 87,1% 90,5% 89,9% 90,4% 89,9% 85,7% 
MRL GLOBAL Forecast 92,6% 95,9% 97,3% 98,4% 97,7% 97,5% 98,1% 98,5% 98,4% 96,8% 100,0% 
Figure 8. LR hit rate (failed companies) 
 
Forecast Healthy s/(H,F) 1yb 2yb 3yb 4yb 5yb 6yb 7yb 8yb 9yb 10yb 11yb 
MRL 1 Forecast 3,7% 2,8% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
MRL 2 Forecast 14,0% 12,1% 1,9% 3,7% 2,8% 1,9% 1,9% 0,9% 1,9% 1,9% 2,9% 
MRL 3 Forecast 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
MRL 4 Forecast 20,6% 20,6% 2,8% 5,6% 3,7% 3,7% 3,7% 3,7% 5,6% 3,8% 3,8% 
MRL GLOBAL Forecast 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
Figure 9. LR hit rate (healthy companies) 
 
3.3.1 Enhancing the basic models with audit-based qualitative signs 
As far as failure prediction relies in financial data, the external control of the reliability 
of the accounting process becomes paramount. Auditors are expected not only to verify 
formal requirements but, also, to warn investors when the audited company faces 
uncertainties that may threaten its survival. Empirical evidence suggests that modified 
opinions (qualified opinion, disclaimer, and adverse opinion) may also convey some 
informational content to external users (Piñeiro et al., 2011): some previous works have 
found that the “disclaimer” report is frequently used to signal extreme client firm’s 
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distress, and a statistically significant relationship between auditor rotation, financial 
distress and the likelihood of an unqualified opinion (Robinson, 2008). Companies try 
to minimize the probability of a qualified opinion and/or a disclosure by changing 
repeatedly its external auditor (Schwartz and Menon, 1985; Schwartz and Soo, 1995; 
Ruiz and Gómez; Blay, 2005) and the resulting situation can be modelled as a game 
(Matsumura et al., 1997; Tucker and Matsumura, 1998).   
We have formulated a logit model to verify the informational content of these external 
signs, namely to evaluate if they can improve our ability to infer unrevealed financial 
distress situations. Factors were subjectively selected according to their relevance in the 
literature: number of auditor changes, rate of modified opinion reports, average duration 
of auditors’ contract, the failure to comply with the obligation to file and disclose its 
financial statements, and the concurrency of auditor changes and the revealing of 
uncertainties. 
 
Coefficients of the model B E.T. Wald gl Sig. Exp(B) C.I. 95,0% for EXP(B) 
        L H 
Step 1(a) RATMOD 0,04 0,01 26,47 1 0,00 1,04 1,02 1,05 
 Intercept -1,54 0,37 17,09 1 0,00 0,21   
Step 2(b) RATMOD 0,03 0,01 20,91 1 0,00 1,03 1,02 1,05 
 DISCLO 21,10 8988,63 0,00 1 1,00 1,45E+09 0,00 . 
 Intercept -22,94 8988,63 0,00 1 1,00 0,00   
Step 3(c) AVDUR -0,32 0,14 4,96 1 0,03 0,73 0,55 0,96 
 RATMOD 0,03 0,01 14,39 1 0,00 1,03 1,01 1,04 
 DISCLO 21,74 8642,69 0,00 1 1,00 2,77E+09 0,00 . 
 Intercept -22,16 8642,69 0,00 1 1,00 0,00   
Model fits fairly well original data, both in estimation and simulation stages. Average 
hit rate reaches 80%, which is a very satisfactory outcome given the qualitative, indirect 
nature of the independent variables, and model’s parsimony. Final model is based in just 
three factors: - The rate of modified opinion reports (RATMOD) - Average duration of auditors’ contract (AVDUR) - The failure to comply with the obligation to file and disclose its financial 
statements (DISCLO) 
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Our results corroborate that it is feasible to infer the existence of unrevealed financial 
distress on the basis of qualitative signs derived from audit reports, even if auditors have 
not issued a going-concern qualification. Companies suffering financial distress have a 
peculiar auditing profile: high rotation of auditors, short term contracts, cost 
interdependencies (complementary services), an abnormally high rate of disclaimer of 
opinion reports, difficulties to meet external information duties (file and disclosure of 
financial statements), and even audit omissions. Our model corroborates that these 
profile can be quantified and used to effectively discriminate financially instable 
companies.  
However, the cross-sectional nature of the model implies that, unlike MDA and logit 
models, it fails in forecasting the inter-temporal failure probabilities: it is only capable 
of predicting the evolution of the company within one period of time. We are currently 
exploring different alternatives in order to improve the model. 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
Several methodologies have been applied to forecast financial distress and the 
likelihood that a company will go bankruptcy. Most of them are applicable just in 
concrete industries or geographical areas. Our work contributes several forecasting 
models intended to be applied in Galician SMEs, and empirical evidence about their 
reliability. Both MDA and logit models attain hit rates up to 80% (logit models do well 
in 90% of the healthy companies). However a systematic bias has been detected: MDA 
models reach good results in identifying distressed companies, and a relatively poor 
performance in healthy companies, while logit models seem to be more suitable to 
identify healthy companies; therefore, MDA models tend to overstate bankruptcy 
probability, while logit models seem to systematically undervalue the inherent credit 
risk of the company. 
This bias seems to be more acute in MDA models, maybe because this methodology 
enforces a discrete view of bankruptcy: a company can only be classified in one of two 
clearly different categories (active vs. failed); but financial distress embraces several 
instability situations and most of them do not lead to a bankruptcy. This might explain 
why MDA models tend to classify as failed those companies in the “grey zone”, that is, 
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companies that are not clearly healthy and, therefore, overstate the likelihood of a 
bankruptcy. 
A joint interpretation of MDA and logit models should lead to a more precise view of 
the financial healthiness of a company. Our work contributes evidence to enhance the 
reliability of both models by including additional variables regarding external auditing: 
average duration of auditors’ contracts, rotation, rate of qualified opinion reports, and 
non-observance of duties regarding the publication of financial information. 
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APPENDIX 
V a r i a b l e s MDA Logit LR 
  Coef.(f) Sig. Coef.(t) Sig. Coef.(wald) Sig. 
Apl04 Net profit/ Loans 
4,284 
(106,2) 
 
0,000 
-110,66 
(7,55) 
 
0,006 
-1,068 
(-6,89) 
 
0,000 
End03 Equity capital/ Loans - - 
5,584 
(2,78) 
 
0,095 
- - 
Rot06 Sales/ total assets 
0,201 
(52,35) 
 
0,000 
-2,603 
(4,38) 
 
0,036 
-0,005 
(-1,98) 
 
0,050 
Sol06 Equity capital/ total assets 
1,311 
(74,69) 
 
0,000 
30,815 
(7,21) 
 
0,007 
-0,327 
(-4,71) 
 
0,000 
Liq12 Non-credit period - - 
2,929 
(4,67) 
 
0,030 
- - 
 Intercept 
-0,339 
- 
- 
8,444 
(7,34) 
 
0,006 
0,584 
(11,41) 
 
0,000 
 Global sig. 
99,736 
(χ2) 
0,000 
149,958 
(χ2) 
0,000 
52,353 
(f) 
0,000 
 
Figure 10. Models - one year before failure 
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 V a r i a b l e s MDA Logit LR 
  Coef.(f) Sig. Coef.(t) Sig. Coef.(wald) Sig. 
Apl04 Net profit/ Loans 7,871 
(91,85) 
 
0,000 
-111,23 
(13,35) 
 
0,000 
-1,979 
(-8,04) 
 
0,000 
Liq12 Non-credit period 0,610 
(50,60) 
 
0,000 
-  -0,153 
(-2,38) 
 
0,019 
 Intercept 0,127 
- 
 
- 
0,974 
(4,28) 
 
0,038 
0,468 
(12,35) 
 
0,000 
 Global sig. 72,928 
(χ2) 
0,000 123,008 
(χ2) 
0,000 50,608 
(f) 
0,000 
 
Figure 11. Models – two years before failure 
 
 V a r i a b l e s MDA Logit LR 
  Coef.(f) Sig. Coef.(t) Sig. Coef.(wald) Sig. 
Ren05 Net profit/ total assets 13,706 
(17,70) 
 
0,000 
-33,765 
(14,67) 
 
0,000 
-3,308 
(-4,19) 
 
0,000 
Sol06 Equity capital/ total assets 2,108 
(40,38) 
 
0,000 
-6,216 
(11,35) 
 
0,000 
-0,509 
(-3,46) 
 
0,001 
Liq05 Cash flow gen. res. / total assets -7,734 
(16,88) 
 
0,000 
- - 1,867 
(3,75) 
 
0,000 
 Intercept -0,980 
- 
 
- 
1,678 
(10,42) 
 
0,001 
0,524 
(8,92) 
 
0,000 
 Global sig. 51,182 
(χ2) 
0,000 85,743 
(χ2) 
0,000 21,331 
(f) 
0,000 
 
Figure 12. Models – three years before failure 
 
 V a r i a b l e s MDA Logit LR 
  Coef.(f) Sig. Coef.(t) Sig. Coef.(wald) Sig. 
Apl04 Net profit/ Loans 6,530 
(26,01) 
 
0,000 
-49,448 
(18,79) 
 
0,000 
-1,586 
(-4,73) 
 
0,000 
End03 Equity capital/ Loans -0,883 
(10,86) 
 
0,000 
4,284 
(6,78) 
 
0,009 
0,215 
(2,11) 
 
0,037 
Est03 Working capital / total assets -2,913 
(11,78) 
 
0,000 
- - -0,707 
(3,01) 
 
0,003 
Ren05 Net profit/ total assets - - 34,773 
(14,09) 
 
0,000 
- - 
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 V a r i a b l e s MDA Logit LR 
  Coef.(f) Sig. Coef.(t) Sig. Coef.(wald) Sig. 
Sol06 Equity capital/ total assets 4,823 
(12,63) 
 
0,000 
-17,348 
(12,77) 
 
0,000 
-1,171 
(-4,19) 
 
0,000 
Liq05 Cash flow gen. res. / total assets -3,891 
(13,71) 
 
0,000 
- - -0,945 
(3,50) 
 
0,001 
Liq12 Non-credit period 1,466 
(16,51) 
 
0,000 
- - -0,356 
(-2,91) 
 
0,004 
 Intercept -0,312 
- 
 
- 
3,102 
(17,18) 
 
0,000 
0,576 
(9,06) 
 
0,000 
 Global sig. 52,371 
(χ2) 
0,000 90,257 
(χ2) 
0,000 10,863 
(f) 
0,000 
 
Figure 13. Models – four years before failure 
 
 V a r i a b l e s MDA Logit LR 
  Coef. (f) Sig. Coef. (t) Sig. Coef. (wald) Sig. 
Apl04 Net profit/ Loans 0,399 
(32,41) 
 
0,000 
- - -0,087 
(-2,00) 
 
0,045 
End03 Equity capital/ Loans 0,376 
(50,19) 
 
0,000 
- - -0,082 
(-3,29) 
 
0,001 
Est03 Working capital / total assets 1,159 
(67,68) 
 
0,000 
-3,711 
(44,24) 
 
0,000 
-0,253 
(-4,29) 
 
0,000 
Rot06 Sales/ total assets 0,011 
(39,25) 
 
0,000 
- - -0,002 
(-2,25) 
 
0,025 
Liq05 Cash flow gen. res. / total assets 1,975 
(95,74) 
 
0,000 
-11,254 
(61,76) 
 
0,000 
-0,431 
(-4,55) 
 
0,000 
 Intercept -0,275 
- 
 
- 
0,6743 
(21,69) 
 
0,000 
0,560 
(23,49) 
 
0,000 
 Global sig. 139,846 
(χ2
0,000 
) 
217,915 
(χ2
0,000 
) 
32,414 
(f) 
0,000 
 
Figure 14. Global model – one to four years before failure  
